



Meltdown / Spectre

Patrick Ladd

Technical Account Manager


January 10th 2018





For your manager...






<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=syAdX44pokE>

```
meltdown@meltdown: ./meltdown
e01d8110: 61 78 20 6f 72 20 73 74 61 74 65 20 6d 61 63 68 |ax or state mach|
e01d8120: 69 6e 65 2c 20 69 74 20 69 73 20 62 65 69 6e 67 |ine, it is being|
e01d8130: 20 75 73 65 64 20 77 69 74 68 20 61 75 74 68 6f | used with autho|
█
```

<https://youtu.be/bReA1dvGJ6Y>



<https://youtu.be/RbHbFkh6eeE>



History / Timeline





Technical Details





Speculative Execution





Side-Channel Attacks






Meltdown

Exploit Code

```
raise_exception();  
// the line below is never reached  
access(probe_array[data * 4096]);
```



Spectre



Exploit Code

Conditional Branch Exploit

```
if (x < array1_size)
    y = array2[array1[x] * 256];
```

Indirect Branch Exploit

Other Variants



Patching



Patching Meltdown

Kernel Patch

Patching Spectre

Variant #1 – Bounds Check Violations

Kernel Patch

Variant #2 – Branch Predictor

Kernel Patch & CPU Microcode Updates



Impact



THE MELTDOWN AND SPECTRE EXPLOITS USE "SPECULATIVE EXECUTION?" WHAT'S THAT?

YOU KNOW THE TROLLEY PROBLEM? WELL, FOR A WHILE NOW, CPUs HAVE BASICALLY BEEN SENDING TROLLEYS DOWN *BOTH* PATHS, QUANTUM-STYLE, WHILE AWAITING YOUR CHOICE. THEN THE UNNEEDED "PHANTOM" TROLLEY DISAPPEARS.



THE PHANTOM TROLLEY ISN'T SUPPOSED TO TOUCH ANYONE. BUT IT TURNS OUT YOU CAN STILL USE IT TO DO STUFF.

AND IT CAN DRIVE THROUGH WALLS.



THAT SOUNDS BAD.

HONESTLY, I'VE BEEN ASSUMING WE WERE DOOMED EVER SINCE I LEARNED ABOUT ROWHAMMER.



WHAT'S THAT?

IF YOU TOGGLE A ROW OF MEMORY CELLS ON AND OFF REALLY FAST, YOU CAN USE ELECTRICAL INTERFERENCE TO FLIP NEARBY BITS AND—

DO WE JUST SUCK AT...COMPUTERS?

YUP. ESPECIALLY SHARED ONES.



SO YOU'RE SAYING THE CLOUD IS FULL OF PHANTOM TROLLEYS ARMED WITH HAMMERS.

...YES. THAT IS EXACTLY RIGHT.

OKAY. I'LL, UH... INSTALL UPDATES?

GOOD IDEA.



Performance Impact

Measurable: 8-19%



Highly cached random memory, with buffered I/O, OLTP database workloads, and benchmarks with high kernel-to-user space transitions are impacted between 8-19%.

- OLTP Workloads (tpc)
- sysbench
- pgbench
- netperf (< 256 byte)
- fio (random I/O to NVME).

Performance Impact

Modest: 3-7%



Database analytics, Decision Support System (DSS), and Java VMs are impacted less than the “Measurable” category. These applications may have significant sequential disk or network traffic, but kernel/device drivers are able to aggregate requests to moderate level of kernel-to-user transitions

- SPECjbb2005
- Queries/Hour
- Overall analytic timing (sec)

Performance Impact

Small: 2-5%



HPC (High Performance Computing) CPU-intensive workloads are affected the least with only 2-5% performance impact because jobs run mostly in user space and are scheduled using cpu-pinning or numa-control.

- Linpack NxN on x86
- SPECcpu2006

Performance Impact

Minimal: <2%



Linux accelerator technologies that generally bypass the kernel in favor of user direct access are the least affected

- DPDK (VsPERF at 64 byte)
- OpenOnload (STAC-N)
- Userspace accesses to VDSO like get-time-of-day are not impacted



Tuning



Kernel Tuning Parameters



noibrs / ibrs_enabled

Indirect Branch Restricted
Speculation (ibrs)

CVE-2017-5715
Variant #2 / Spectre



noibpb / ibpb_enabled

Indirect Branch Prediction
Barriers (ibpb)

CVE-2017-5715
Variant #2 / Spectre



nopti / pti_enabled

Kernel Page Table Isolation (pti)

CVE-2017-5754
Variant #3 / Meltdown

Architectural Defaults

Automatically Depending on Detected Architecture



Variants 1,2,3 Enabled

```
pti 1 ibrs 1 ibpb 1 -> fix variant#1,2,3  
pti 1 ibrs 0 ibpb 0 -> fix variant#1 #3 (for  
older Intel systems with no microcode update  
available)
```



Variants 1,2 Enabled
Not Vulnerable to #3

```
pti 0 ibrs 0 ibpb 2 -> fix variant #1 #2  
if the microcode update is applied  
pti 0 ibrs 2 ibpb 1 -> fix variant #1 #2  
on older processors that can disable indirect  
branch prediction without microcode updates
```



What Do I Do Now?





Resources



Resources

Red Hat Customer Portal



Master Vulnerability Page

<https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/speculativeexecution>



Performance Impact

<https://access.redhat.com/articles/3307751>



Tunables

<https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301>

Resources

Red Hat



What you need to know – Jon Masters

<https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/what-are-meltdown-and-spectre-here%E2%80%99s-what-you-need-know>



Q&A Webinar - *Thursday, January 11 at 11:00AM EST*

<https://onlinexperiences.com/Launch/QReg/ShowKey=47447&AffiliateData=701f2000000tsoPAAQ&>

Resources

External



Meltdown Paper

<https://meltdownattack.com/meltdown.pdf>



Spectre Paper

<https://spectreattack.com/spectre.pdf>



Google Project Zero

<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.ca/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html>

Resources

External



Meltdown Exploit POC Code

<https://github.com/IAIK/meltdown>



THANK YOU



plus.google.com/+RedHat



linkedin.com/company/red-hat



youtube.com/user/RedHatVideos



facebook.com/redhatinc



twitter.com/RedHatNews