



1. User process does initial operation requiring an NFS object which requires `rpcsec_gss` authentication.
2. Kernel code discovers it has no cached context for this user/server combination and does an upcall to obtain a security context.  
The request is done by pumping a `gssx_arg_init_sec_context` RPC request up to a file like it is done now for `rpc.svcgssd` (except this use a manually crafted protocol).  
`gss-proxy` assumes the user has a credential cache and a valid `krbtgt`.  
If a valid `ccache` is found for the user the `gss-proxy` calls the actual `gss_init_sec_context()` GSSAPI call and eventually acquires a ticket for the remote server.
3. `gss-proxy` sends down a `gssx_res_init_sec_context` reply containing a context reference and `aa` token to send to the server.
4. The NFS client sends a NULL RPC call to the server.
5. The server performs a `gssx_arg_accept_sec_context` RPC call to the server's `gss-proxy`.  
It performs an actual GSSAPI `gss_accept_sec_context()` call using the NFS keytab, and completes the negotiation.
6. The `gss-proxy` returns a `gss_res_accept_sec_context` RPC reply to the NFS server which contains a lucid context, a set of credentials, and an output token.
7. The NFS server returns the token to the client
8. The client takes the token and makes a second `gssx_arg_init_sec_context()` call to `gss-proxy`
9. The `gss-proxy` complete the init context and returns a lucid context to the kernel in a `gss_res_init_sec_context` reply.
10. The original operation can now be performed using the security context cached by the kernel.
11. Response to the original operation
12. Results are returned to the user process

