From g_alcala@postoffice.pacbell.net Sun Sep 9 13:54:09 2001 Path: cygnus.com!enews.sgi.com!feeder.via.net!cyclone-sf.pbi.net!206.13.28.143!news.pacbell.net.POSTED!not-for-mail Message-ID: <3B9B0FF9.31DEE2BF@postoffice.pacbell.net> From: Guy Alcala Reply-To: g_alcala@junkpacbell.net X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.76 [en] (Win98; U) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military Subject: Re: Tiny U.S. planes spy as GIs avoid danger References: <3B8968F2.1BF5F222@postoffice.pacbell.net> <20010826174836.01486.00001593@mb-cp.aol.com> <7b887ead.0108290317.68447559@posting.google.com> <999087735.23526.0.nnrp-13.3e31c872@news.demon.co.uk> <7b887ead.0108312350.28dba222@posting.google.com> <3b90ef60.47383975@news.earthlink.net> <3B914665.F8B5742D@postoffice.pacbell.net> <3b9253d5.138650213@news.earthlink.net> <3B92F36E.D048EB9C@postoffice.pacbell.net> <3b9394ef.75794206@news.earthlink.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Lines: 170 Date: Sat, 08 Sep 2001 23:45:13 -0700 NNTP-Posting-Host: 206.171.36.116 X-Complaints-To: abuse@pacbell.net X-Trace: news.pacbell.net 1000017842 206.171.36.116 (Sat, 08 Sep 2001 23:44:02 PDT) NNTP-Posting-Date: Sat, 08 Sep 2001 23:44:02 PDT Organization: SBC Internet Services Xref: cygnus.com rec.aviation.military:446957 Back from a short vacation. Ed Rasimus wrote: > Guy Alcala wrote: > > >Ed Rasimus wrote: > > > >> Regarding the rote memorization aspects, that was a reference to > >> earlier training, i.e. WW II. Certainly there are rote aspects, but > >> when we get to issues of systems operation, weapons delivery, spatial > >> relationships of multiple players, etc. there is more "art than > >> science". Start talking about missile employment parameters in a fluid > >> environment and you begin to create some intellectual challenges that > >> reach beyond rote. IMHO. > > > >Sure. OTOH, as you have mentioned in the past, you didn't have a clue how the > >Sparrow worked or should be employed, despite the advantage of your college > >education. Which would have been more valuable to you in combat then: taking > >another six months training time to study missile employment, or spending four > >years getting a degree in an unrelated and irrelevant field? The answer seems > >pretty obvious to me. > > Whoa. I've said in the past that a lot of the complexities of the > Sparrow were not adequately trained before I got to war in the > Phantom. For example I never knew what the little dot running around > the space between the two circles in BIT 5 meant, and I still am > unsure exactly what function English Bias relates to. But, I knew what > the radar display was telling me and I knew what a lock-on required > and I knew what switchology was involved. That's considerably > different than "didn't have a clue." > > I also during that tour had the benefit of eight years of military > aviation experience, qualification in five different aircraft, four > years of IP time, and a full and somewhat challenging previous combat > tour. I was flying an aircraft, F-4E that, when tasked in the air > superiority mission, carried three alternative weapons and was > employed under ROE that required VID, so Sparrow employment was not > primary. > > I'd had my four year degree for quite a while. Ed, I was quoting your own characterization. From Deja [please note your aside;-) ]: From: Ed Rasimus (thunder@rmii.com) Subject: Re: AIM-7 after VN was: F-104 air to air peformance Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military Date: 1999/06/10 You'll seldom get a tactical aviator to confess that he didn't have a clue, but I'll admit it with regard to the F-4/AIM-7 system. (Of course, it's just between you and me and if you tell anyone else, I'll deny I ever said it--especially, don't let Guy Alcala know!) I went to war in the F-4 after a "Cat IV" checkout which was 45 days and just under 30 hours flying time in F-4Cs at Luke. I arrived at Korat to fly E's which had a considerably different weapons system--and within the first month the wing converted to TCTO-556 with yet a different cockpit configuration. I learned about Dive Toss fairly quickly and didn't have much trouble taking advantage of the better radar, but that can be related to the fact that I'd done a lot of radar work in the 105. I don't know how guys whose previous experience had been in the F-100 or 86 were able to get much out of the scope after a short course checkout. My understanding of the AIM-7E was pretty much that the WSO would lockup and I'd shoot when the dot was centered and the circle got big. In most instances I'd be swatting at the plastic tubing extension we all put on the weapons select switch (or after -556 flipping the pinky switch) to go to AIM-9 or guns because we couldn't get a lock, we were inside parameters or the missiles didn't "tune"--whatever that meant. I could understand "growl" and Sidewinder boresighting, and guns tracking was natural but things like English Bias and "interlocks" were all Greek to me. Training never improved much during the five years I spent flying Phantoms. The details of AIM-7E-2 employment were locked in the safes in the Wing Weapons shop and only doled out grudgingly by the "target arms." The secrets of intercept geometry were readily available and with practice even an ol' ground attack puke like me could figure out how to "hot up" an intercept to keep from tail chasing, but the details of even the bit checks were never well understood. (What was the significance of making the dot run around between the two circles anyway??) With the establishment of the Aggressors and wide-spread emphasis on DACT, I got to improve my BFM skills and apply some tactics but the concentration was on WVR maneuver to guns or a lagging Sidewinder shot. We still never got regular, detailed, tactically applied instruction on AIM-7 parameters and employment. I've got great sympathy now for guys like you, Dweezil, who were trying to decipher what went wrong when some sloping forehead fighter pilot complained that the #$%#!*& missile didn't work. I never did have a clue about what the Sparrow was supposed to do or how it did it. Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (ret) --------------------------------------------------------- I don't know about you, but I'd say that lack of knowledge about the AIM-7E2 weapon envelope (do you know that the 432nd guys used it more often than the AIM-9E because it had higher launch G capability and similar min range?), what the interlocks switch did, etc., what missile tuning was and how to correct a problem, could have been a considerable handicap. Now, I know that you had already completed your degree; my point was that, rather than getting that degree, it would have been far more useful to you to spend a much shorter period of time being taught AIM-7E2 employment. > >> Once again, the USAF does what works for them. They choose to set > >> requirements (arbitrary possibly, but effective, undeniably) and > >> policies. The USAF has, so far, said all pilots must be officers, all > >> officers must have four year degrees, and all officers serve in an "up > >> or out" system. This is under discussion now and has been debated in > >> the past. > > > >And what we're discussing is not whether these requirements and policies are > >effective, but whether they have a non-arbitrary, logical basis, and especially > >whether they give the best results at the lowest cost. I contend that they fall > >short on both counts. > > I've agreed that the requirements might be arbitrary, but I've (at > least from my POV) explained that the statistics show that they are > effective parameters for selection of input candidates--this is as a > result of 23 years of experience in the field, ranging from > instructing in UPT to managing the personnel office responsible for > selection and attrition to follow on work in industry grappling with > the problem of criteria for training of advanced tactical fighters. > This is what is usually referred to as professional expertise. > You, OTOH, have simply repeated (dare I say incessantly), Yes, you may, because I've had to when different individuals quote me out of context or distort my remarks. It's tiresome reading for those who haven't, so let me I apologize to you and any others who found it tedious; I find it tedious to keep having to type it. > that the > qualfication criteria are arbitrary and would have ruled you out, > thereby denying the AF a highly motivated (but, to this day unproven) > pilot. No, that's an incorrect characterization. I've already pointed out that I consider myself unsuited to be a fighter pilot for several other and far more valid reasons, including ability to multi-task and psychological profile. > Let me say it again, hopefully in a bottom line format, that: > > 1. the criteria may be arbitrary > 2. statistics show improvement in attrition rates since enactment > 3. there is no shortage of training input > 4. the possibility of success by lesser qualified candidates exists > 5. lower qualification criteria (despite arbitrariness) increase > attrition > 6. the criteria aren't about to change in the near future. And I agree with most of the above,with the qualification that we disagree on the definition of "lesser qualified." My point is that _different_ qualifications are not necessarily _lesser_ ones. Also, while no. 3 is true, that doesn't seem to be the issue; it's not training input but retention that's the problem, leading to less-experienced pilots. Guy