

NETWORK-BOUND DISK ENCRYPTION

NYRHUG Monthly Meeting - February 2020

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Booting...

Disk Password:

Booting...

Disk Password: █

Booting...

Disk Password: █

Booting...


Disk Password: █

Booting...

Disk Password: █

Booting...

Disk Password: █



Booting...
Disk Password: █

Booting...
Disk Password: █

Booting...
Disk Password: █

Booting...
Disk Password: █

Booting...
Disk Password: █

Booting...
Disk Password: █

YESTERDAY

TODAY

TOMORROW



Standards (AES, PCI-DSS, etc.)

Automation


Policy

HOW DO WE AUTOMATE?

Shh... I'm Secret!




Encryption Key



Shh... I'm Secret!

Encryption Key

Key Encryption Key




Shh... I'm Secret!

Encryption Key

Key Encryption Key

"correct battery horse staple"



Shh... I'm Secret!



STANDARD PASSWORD MODEL

Encryption Key

Key Encryption Key

"correct battery horse staple"

Shh... I'm Secret!





STANDARD ESCROW MODEL?

Encryption Key

Key Encryption Key

"d41d8cd9...ecf8427e"

Shh... I'm Secret!





STANDARD ESCROW MODEL?

Encryption Key


Key Encryption Key

"d41d8cd9...ecf8427e"

Shh... I'm Secret!



TLS / GSSAPI





STANDARD ESCROW MODEL?

Encryption Key


Key Encryption Key

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TLS / GSSAPI




STANDARD ESCROW MODEL?

Encryption Key


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TLS / GSSAPI







STANDARD ESCROW MODEL?

Encryption Key

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TLS / GSSAPI



STANDARD ESCROW MODEL

Encryption Key

Key Encryption Key

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STANDARD ESCROW MODEL

Encryption Key


Key Encryption Key

"d41d8cd9...ecf8427e"

HEARTBLEED

TLS / GSSAPI

Shh... I'm Secret!




LESSONS LEARNED

- Presuming TLS will protect key transfer is dangerous
- Complexity increases attack surface
- Escrows are difficult to deploy
- X.509 is hard to get right

ASYMMETRIC CRYPTO?

BRACE YOURSELVES,



MATH IS COMING

(EC) DIFFIE-HELLMAN KEY EXCHANGE

$$\begin{array}{ccc} C \in_R [1, p-1] & & S \in_R [1, p-1] \\ c = gC & & s = gS \\ c \longrightarrow & | & \longleftarrow s \\ K = gSC = sC & & K = gCS = cS \end{array}$$

BINDING WITH ECDH (INSECURE)

PROVISIONING

$C \in_R [1, p - 1]$
 $c = gC$
 $K = gSC = sC$
Discard : K, C
Retain : s, c

$S \in_R [1, p - 1]$
 $s = gS$
 $\leftarrow s$

RECOVERY

$c \longrightarrow$

$K = xS$
 $\leftarrow K$

Weaknesses:

- ① K is revealed to a passive attacker.
- ② With c , the passive attacker can get K .
- ③ Server learns c and therefore K .

Resolved: c **MUST** be private

MCCALLUM-RELYEA KEY EXCHANGE

PROVISIONING

$C \in_R [1, p - 1]$
 $c = gC$
 $K = gSC = sC$
Discard : K, C
Retain : s, c

$S \in_R [1, p - 1]$
 $s = gS$
 $\leftarrow s$

RECOVERY

$E \in_R [1, p - 1]$
 $e = gE$
 $x = c + e$
 $x \longrightarrow$

$y = xS$
 $\leftarrow y$


$K = y - sE$

Because : $K = gCS + gES - gSE$

To keep c private, e & E **MUST** be private.


Encryption Key

Key Encryption Key




Shh... I'm Secret!

MR Exchange





Encryption Key

Key Encryption Key



Shh... I'm Secret!

MR Exchange



Property	Escrow	MR Exchange
Server presence during provisioning	Required	Optional
Server presence during recovery	Required	Required
Server knowledge of keys	Required	None
Key transfer	Required	None
Client authentication	Required	Optional
Transport encryption	Required	Optional
End-to-end Encryption	Difficult	Unneeded

TANG

- <https://github.com/latchset/tang>
- Server-side daemon
- Simple: HTTP + JOSE
- Fast (>2k req/sec)
- Extremely small
- Minimal dependencies
- RHEL 7.4

INSTALLING A TANG SERVER

```
$ sudo yum install tang
```

```
$ sudo systemctl enable --now tangd.socket
```

CLEVIS

- <https://github.com/latchset/clevis/>
- Decryption automation and policy framework
- Minimal dependencies
- Early boot integration
- GNOME integration
- RHEL 7.4

BASIC ENCRYPTION WITH TANG / LUKSV1

```
$ yum install clevis
```

```
$ echo redhat | clevis encrypt tang '{"url":"http://localhost"}' > mydata.jwe  
The advertisement is signed with the following keys:
```

```
    haD7Y-8VkAyJo6-vdZMrGQXCSfI
```

```
Do you wish to trust the advertisement? [yN] y
```

```
$ cat mydata.jwe
```

```
{"ciphertext":"-059czAqybvxDme2t3I5A", ...}
```

```
$ clevis decrypt < mydata.jwe  
redhat
```

```
$ systemctl stop tangd.socket
```

```
$ clevis decrypt < mydata.jwe
```

```
$ echo $?
```

```
1
```


DISK BINDING WITH TANG

```
$ clevis bind luks -d /dev/sda1 tang '{"url":"http://tang.srv"}'
```

The advertisement is signed with the following keys:

```
haD7Y-8VkJAyJo6-vdZMrGQXCSfI
```

Do you wish to trust the advertisement? [yN] y

Enter passphrase for /dev/sda1:

```
$ luksmeta show -d /dev/sda1
```

```
0 active empty
```

```
1 active cb6e8904-81ff-40da-a84a-07ab9ab5715e
```

```
2 inactive empty
```

```
3 inactive empty
```

```
...
```

```
# For root volume unlocking at boot:
```

```
$ yum install clevis-dracut
```

```
$ dracut -f
```

```
$ reboot
```

```
# For removable storage GNOME unlocking:
```

```
$ yum install clevis-udisks2
```

KNOWN ISSUES

dracut / NetworkManager integration problems

- Active BZ with fix pending
- Shouldn't hurt in most cases, but it looks bad

```
[root@nbde7 ~]$ ip route
default via 192.168.122.1 dev eth0
default via 192.168.122.1 dev eth0 proto dhcp metric 100
192.168.122.0/24 dev eth0 proto kernel scope link src 192.168.122.170
192.168.122.0/24 dev eth0 proto kernel scope link src 192.168.122.170 metric 100
```


FROM AUTOMATION TO POLICY

YESTERDAY

Standards (AES, PCI-DSS, etc.)


TODAY

Automation




TOMORROW


Policy




SHAMIR SECRET SHARING




SHAMIR SECRET SHARING




SIMPLE LAPTOP




AUTOMATED LAPTOP



HIGH SECURITY SYSTEM



COMPLEX LAPTOP POLICY



BASIC SHAMIR'S WITH TANG

```
$ echo PT | clevis encrypt sss \  
'{"pins": {"tang": [{"url": "http://a.tang.srv"}, {"url": "http://b.tang.srv"}]}, "t": 1}' \  
> out.jwe  
The advertisement is signed with the following keys:  
    haD7Y-8VkJAyJo6-vdZMrGQXCSfI  
  
Do you wish to trust the advertisement? [yN] y  
  
The advertisement is signed with the following keys:  
    Edp-ESShUx4_95kGt-DTsCBbPag  
  
Do you wish to trust the advertisement? [yN] y  
  
$ clevis decrypt < out.jwe  
PT  
  
# Bring Down Tang Server A  
$ clevis decrypt < out.jwe  
PT  
  
# Bring Down Tang Server B  
$ clevis decrypt < out.jwe  
$ echo $?  
1
```

EXPLORING THE ECOSYSTEM

DEPENDENCY: JOSÉ

- <https://github.com/latchset/jose>
- JSON Object Signing and Encryption
- C Library & Command Line Utility
- Bottom Line: User-Friendly, Standards Compliant Crypto

```
$ jose jwk gen -i '{"alg": "A128GCM"}' -o oct.jwk
$ jose jwk gen -i '{"alg": "RSA1_5"}' -o rsa.jwk
$ jose jwk gen -i '{"alg": "ES256"}' -o ec.jwk

$ echo hi | jose jwe enc -i- -k rsa.pub.jwk -o msg.jwe
$ jose jwe dec -i msg.jwe -k rsa.jwk
hi
$ jose jwe dec -i msg.jwe -k oct.jwk
Decryption failed!

$ echo hi | jose jws sig -i- -k ec.jwk -o msg.jws
$ jose jws ver -i msg.jws -k ec.pub.jwk
hi
$ jose jws ver -i msg.jws -k oct.jwk
No signatures validated!
```

DEPENDENCY: LUKSMETA

- <https://github.com/latchset/luksmeta>
- Store metadata in LUKSv1 header gap
- C library & Command Line Utility

```
$ echo hi | luksmeta save -d /dev/sdc1 -s 2 -u EC998562-B60D-47F0-A579-DCA8C12F5BF6
```

```
$ luksmeta load -d /dev/sdc1 -s 2 -u EC998562-B60D-47F0-A579-DCA8C12F5BF6  
hi
```

```
$ luksmeta load -d /dev/sdc1 -s 2 -u 12618962-A1E5-48F1-B327-D7C60E20FC02  
Slot contains different UUID
```

JOSÉ

- PKCS#11 Support
- Python Bindings
- Additional crypto backends
- Additional algorithms

CLEVIS

- Password Pin
- PKCS#11 Pin (including, in the future, TPM)
- Ext4 encryption support

TANG

- Binding IDs (Optional; sacrifices anonymity)
- Revocation (requires Binding IDs)

FUTURE FEATURES

[Done](#)

us


[Help!](#)

Device Selection

Select the device(s) you'd like to install to. They will be left untouched until you click on the main menu's "Begin Installation" button.

Local Standard Disks

20 GiB




0x1af4

vda / 20 GiB free

Disks left unselected here will not be touched.

Specialized & Network Disks



Add a disk...

Disks left unselected here will not be touched.

Storage Configuration

Automatic Custom

I would like to make additional space available.

Encryption

Encrypt my data. You'll set a passphrase next.

[Full disk summary and boot loader...](#)

1 disk selected; 20 GiB capacity; 20 GiB free [Refresh...](#)

DISK ENCRYPTION PASSPHRASE

You have chosen to encrypt some of your data. You will need to create a passphrase that you will use to access your data when you start your computer.

Passphrase:

 No password supplied

 us

Empty

Confirm:



Warning: You won't be able to switch between keyboard layouts (from the default one) when you decrypt your disks after install.

Cancel

Save Passphrase

DEMO

RESOURCES

- RHEL 7:

- https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-US/Red_Hat_Enterprise_Linux/7/html/Security_Guide/sec-Using_Network-Bound_Disk_Encryption.html

- RHEL 8:

- https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/8/html/security_hardening/configuring-automated-unlocking-of-encrypted-volumes-using-policy-based-decryption_security-hardening

- Multi-device setup

- <https://access.redhat.com/articles/4500491>

QUESTIONS?

