




# Red Hat RHEL9 Security Tip #1

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## TIP #1

Encryption at rest – encrypted file systems using LUKS





## What is LUKS?

### Linux Unified Key Setup

Encrypt a block device, logical device or a partition

Requires a passphrase – stored in one KeySlot

Can store multiple passphrases

### Ciphers

Default = aes-xts-plain64

AES

Twofish

Serpent

### KeySize

Default = 512 bits

# cryptsetup benchmark

## LUKS Setup – Passphrase Prompting

```
# cryptsetup luksFormat /dev/sdb  
# cryptsetup luksDump /dev/sdb  
# cryptsetup luksUUID /dev/sdb or # blkid /dev/sdb  
# cryptsetup luksOpen /dev/sdb SECRET
```

```
### PROMPT FOR PASSPHRASE
```

```
# mkfs.xfs /dev/mapper/SECRET  
# mount /dev/mapper/SECRET /mnt/SECRET  
# blkid /dev/mapper/SECRET
```

---

### Update files for mounting

```
/etc/crypttab  
SECRET UUID=1e1f836b-fbcb-4907-949e-10a2661924b1 none luks,discard
```

```
/etc/fstab  
UUID=831f480a-8b76-404b-b8bd-e0a41f69c1a6 /mnt/SECRET xfs defaults,discard 0 0
```

## LUKS Setup – Passphrase in Keyfile

```
# cryptsetup luksFormat /dev/sdb
# cryptsetup luksDump /dev/sdb
# cryptsetup luksUUID /dev/sdb or # blkid /dev/sdb
# echo -n 'mysecretpassphrase' > /root/keyfile && history -c
# chmod 400 /root/keyfile
# cryptsetup luksOpen /dev/sdb SECRET --key-file /root/keyfile
```

```
# mkfs.xfs /dev/mapper/SECRET
# mount /dev/mapper/SECRET /mnt/SECRET
# blkid /dev/mapper/SECRET
```

---

### Update files for mounting

```
/etc/crypttab
SECRET UUID=1e1f836b-fbcb-4907-949e-10a2661924b1 /root/keyfile luks,discard
```

```
/etc/fstab
UUID=831f480a-8b76-404b-b8bd-e0a41f69c1a6 /mnt/SECRET xfs defaults,discard 0 0
```

## LUKS Upgrade/Conversion

LUKS2 was introduced in RHEL 7.6

LUKS2 supports 32 keys slots vs only 8 key slots in LUKS1

LUKS2 supports two JSON metadata headers

Can not upgrade LUKS1 to LUKS2 if

- Device is active

- CLEVIS is being used

```
# cypsetup luksHeaderBackup /dev/sdb --header-backup-file /root/luks-header-backup.bin
```

```
# cryptsetup convert --type luks2 /dev/sdb
```

## LUKS Maintenance

LUKS2 supports online re-encryption

Change the encryption algorithm or key-size

### MODES

Default = checksum (balance performance and protection)

journal (safest mode, requires two writes)

none (fastest mode)

```
# cryptsetup reencrypt --resilience MODE --cipher twofish-xts-plain64 /dev/sdb
```

```
# cryptsetup reencrypt --resilience MODE --key-size 256 /dev/sdb (*must be multiple of 8*)
```

LUKS2 re-encryption recovery will trigger automatically on next  
“cryptsetup open” or “cryptsetup repair” command

LUKS1 does NOT support online re-encryption

## LUKS Maintenance

LUKS2 supports passphrase additions, removals

View Keyslots

```
# cryptsetup luksDump /dev/sdb
```

Change Passphrase

```
# cryptsetup luksChangeKey /dev/sdb
```

Add Passphrase

```
# cryptsetup luksAddKey /dev/sdb
```

Remove Passphrase

```
# cryptsetup luksRemoveKey /dev/sdb
```



## LUKS Encrypt existing File System?

Yes, it is possible

For XFS filesystem:

First need to unmount and extend existing file system by 32M for LUKS Header

```
# umount /mnt/DATA  
# lvextend -L+32M /dev/mapper/NVME2048
```

Create LUKS volume with **reencrypt** option

```
# cryptsetup reencrypt --encrypt --reduce-device-size=32M /dev/mapper/NVME2048  
# cryptsetup luksOpen /dev/mapper/NVME2048 SECRET  
# mount /dev/mapper/SECRET /mnt/SECRET
```


For ext4, a filesystem you can also shrink by 32M vs extending if you want.  
XFS can NOT shrink filesystems.

## LUKS Removal

```
# cryptsetup status /dev/mapper/SECRET  
# cryptsetup luksClose SECRET  
# cryptsetup erase /dev/sdb  
  
### PROMPT FOR PASSPHRASE
```

## LUKS Network Bound Disk Encryption (NBDE)

Feature to unlock a LUKS volume via a network connection from a service  
CLEVIS (client) → TANG (server/service)



Leverages the private/public key exchange algorithm: McCallum-Relyea

## NBDE TANG Server Setup

```
# dnf -y install tang  
# systemctl enable tangd.socket --now
```

Check for TANG service connectivity, is service publishing public keys?

```
# curl -f http://tang1.i.skinnerlabs.com/adv  
# curl -f http://tang2.i.skinnerlabs.com/adv
```

## NBDE CLEVIS Client

Supports three modes:

- tang (single remote key lookup)

- tpm2 (Trusted Platform Module 2.0)

- sss (multiple tang servers “Shamir’s Secret Sharing”)

## LUKS NBDE CLEVIS Setup / Registration

```
# dnf -y install clevis clevis-luks clevis-dracut
```

Bind TANG pin/token to an existing LUKS volume SECRET

```
# clevis luks bind -d /dev/mapper/SECRET tang '{"url": "http://tang1.i.skinnerlabs.com"}'
```

Or Bind to multiple pins/tokens to an existing LUKS volume SECRET

```
# clevis luks bind -d /dev/mapper/SECRET sss  
  '{"t":1,"pins":{"tang":[{"url":"http://tang1.i.skinnerlabs.com"}, {"url":"http://tang2.i.skinnerlabs.com"}]}}'
```

```
# clevis luks list -d /dev/mapper/SECRET
```


```
/etc/crypttab
```

```
SECRET UUID=1e1f836b-fbcb-4907-949e-10a2661924b1 none luks,discard
```

## LUKS NBDE on root?

```
# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="rd.neednet=1"  
# dracut -fv --regenerate-all
```

# LUKS NBDE TANG/CLEVIS Key Rotation





## LUKS NBDE TANG/CLEVIS Key Rotation

On TANG Server:

Private keys are stored at: /var/db/tang

Rotate TANG keys:

```
# tang-show-keys
```

```
# tangd-keygen /var/db/tang
```

Delete old keys after ALL clients updated!

---

On CLEVIS Client:

```
# clevis luks list -d /dev/mapper/SECRET -s 1
```

```
# clevis luks regen -d /dev/mapper/SECRET -s 1
```

OR

```
# clevis luks unbind -d /dev/mapper/SECRET -s 1
```

```
THEN REBIND
```

## CLEVIS Trusted Platform Module (TPM2) Registration

Does your devices have TPM?

```
# ls /dev/tpm*
```

```
# cat /sys/class/tpm/tpm*/tpm_version_major
```

```
# clevis luks bind -d /dev/sdb tpm2 '{"hash":"sha256","key":"rsa","pcr_bank":"sha256","pcr_ids":"0,1"}'
```

```
# clevis luks list -d /dev/sdb
```

```
/etc/crypttab
```

```
SECRET UUID=831f480a-8b76-404b-b8bd-e0a41f69c1a6
```

OR

```
# systemd-cryptenroll --tpm2-device=auto --tpm2-pcrs=0,1 /dev/sdb
```

```
/etc/crypttab
```

```
SECRET UUID=1e1f836b-fbcb-4907-949e-10a2661924b1 - --tpm2-device=auto
```

## LUKS NBDE RHEL System Roles (now over 30)

```
# dnf -y install rhel-system-roles ansible-core
```

Configure CLEVIS clients (does not currently support CLEVIS TPM2)

**nbde\_client**

Configure TANG server

**nbde\_server**

Documentation and examples:

[/usr/share/doc/rhel-system-roles/nbde\\_client/](/usr/share/doc/rhel-system-roles/nbde_client/)

[/usr/share/ansible/roles/rhel-system-roles.nbde\\_server/](/usr/share/ansible/roles/rhel-system-roles.nbde_server/)

# LUKS NBDE CLEVIS with Cockpit

```
# dnf -y install cockpit-storage, cockpit
```

The screenshot shows the Cockpit storage management interface for a LUKS encrypted partition. The interface is titled "RED HAT ENTERPRISE LINUX" and shows the user "Joe Sec" with "Privileged" access. The storage details for the partition `/dev/sda` are displayed, including a capacity of 14.9 GiB (16.0 GB, 16013852672 bytes). The "Content" section shows a 14.9 GiB encrypted data partition at `/dev/sda1`. The "Encryption" tab is active, showing the "Stored passphrase" with an "Edit" button and "Options" set to "(none)". A "Keys" section is visible with a "+" button to add a new key. Below the keys, a "Passphrase" entry for "Slot 0" is shown with an edit icon and a "-" button to remove the slot. The bottom of the interface shows the LUKS mapper path `/dev/mapper/luks-639fb24e-76de-4f34-b752-e257b9f856e4` and a warning icon.

## LUKS Kickstart Options

```
part pv.01 --size=10240 --grow --encrypted --passphrase=kickstart
```

--encrypted

--passphrase

--escrowcert

--backupperphrase

--cipher

--luks-version


## YubiKey Registration

What is a YubiKey?

Two-factor authentication device


```
# dnf -y install ykpers yubikey-manager-qt
```

Launch YubiKey Manager GUI




# YubiKey Manager

Get details about your YubiKey  
Is it detected?



# YubiKey Manager


Enable only FIDO2 Interface





# YubiKey Manager

Select FIDO2  
Change PIN via GUI



## YubiKey Binding

Updated pin via CLI

```
# ykman fido access change-pin
```

Confirm YubiKey settings and detection

```
# systemd-cryptenroll --fido2-device=list
```

Bind YubiKey to LUKS device

```
# systemd-cryptenroll /dev/mapper/NVME2048 --fido2-device=auto --fido2-with-client-pin=yes
```

OR

```
# systemd-cryptenroll /dev/mapper/NVME2048 --fido2-device=auto  
--fido2-with-client-pin=yes --wipe-slot=fido2
```

/etc/crypttab

```
SECRET UUID=1e1f836b-fbcb-4907-949e-10a2661924b1 none luks,discard,fido2-device=auto
```



## YubiKey Gotcha

Which KeySlot was consumed by FIDO2?

```
# cryptsetup luksDump /dev/mapper/NVME2048
```

If it is KeySlot 2, you will need to press your YubiKey twice

If it is KeySlot 3, you will need to press your YubiKey thrice

Etc ...

I recommend making sure your FIDO2 KeySlot is assigned to slot 1, or this will drive you crazy!



## Which Option is Best?



| TYPE           | INTERACTIVE | AUTOMATED | TIED TO SYSTEM | TIED TO NETWORK | MULTIFACTOR |
|----------------|-------------|-----------|----------------|-----------------|-------------|
| Passphrase     | X           |           |                |                 |             |
| Keyfile        |             | X         | X/*            | X/*             |             |
| NBDE<br>CLEVIS |             | X         |                | X               |             |
| CLEVIS<br>TPM2 |             | X         | X              |                 |             |
| TPM2           |             | X         | X              |                 |             |
| YUBIKEY        | X           |           |                |                 | X           |

\* Depends on where Keyfile is stored: local disk or network disk

# Thank you

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